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DSS.py
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DSS.pyi
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PKCS1_PSS.py
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PKCS1_PSS.pyi
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PKCS1_v1_5.py
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PKCS1_v1_5.pyi
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__init__.py
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__pycache__
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eddsa.py
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eddsa.pyi
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pkcs1_15.py
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pkcs1_15.pyi
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pss.py
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pss.pyi
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Editing: pkcs1_15.py
# =================================================================== # # Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com> # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions # are met: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with the # distribution. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS # "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT # LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, # INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, # BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; # LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER # CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT # LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN # ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # =================================================================== import Crypto.Util.number from Crypto.Util.number import ceil_div, bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerSequence, DerNull, DerOctetString, DerObjectId class PKCS115_SigScheme: """A signature object for ``RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5``. Do not instantiate directly. Use :func:`Crypto.Signature.pkcs1_15.new`. """ def __init__(self, rsa_key): """Initialize this PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme object. :Parameters: rsa_key : an RSA key object Creation of signatures is only possible if this is a *private* RSA key. Verification of signatures is always possible. """ self._key = rsa_key def can_sign(self): """Return ``True`` if this object can be used to sign messages.""" return self._key.has_private() def sign(self, msg_hash): """Create the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature of a message. This function is also called ``RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN`` and it is specified in `section 8.2.1 of RFC8017 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#page-36>`_. :parameter msg_hash: This is an object from the :mod:`Crypto.Hash` package. It has been used to digest the message to sign. :type msg_hash: hash object :return: the signature encoded as a *byte string*. :raise ValueError: if the RSA key is not long enough for the given hash algorithm. :raise TypeError: if the RSA key has no private half. """ # See 8.2.1 in RFC3447 modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n) k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes # Step 1 em = _EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, k) # Step 2a (OS2IP) em_int = bytes_to_long(em) # Step 2b (RSASP1) m_int = self._key._decrypt(em_int) # Step 2c (I2OSP) signature = long_to_bytes(m_int, k) return signature def verify(self, msg_hash, signature): """Check if the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature over a message is valid. This function is also called ``RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY`` and it is specified in `section 8.2.2 of RFC8037 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#page-37>`_. :parameter msg_hash: The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object belonging to the :mod:`Crypto.Hash` module. :type parameter: hash object :parameter signature: The signature that needs to be validated. :type signature: byte string :raise ValueError: if the signature is not valid. """ # See 8.2.2 in RFC3447 modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n) k = ceil_div(modBits, 8) # Convert from bits to bytes # Step 1 if len(signature) != k: raise ValueError("Invalid signature") # Step 2a (O2SIP) signature_int = bytes_to_long(signature) # Step 2b (RSAVP1) em_int = self._key._encrypt(signature_int) # Step 2c (I2OSP) em1 = long_to_bytes(em_int, k) # Step 3 try: possible_em1 = [ _EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, k, True) ] # MD2/4/5 hashes always require NULL params in AlgorithmIdentifier. # For all others, it is optional. try: algorithm_is_md = msg_hash.oid.startswith('1.2.840.113549.2.') except AttributeError: algorithm_is_md = False if not algorithm_is_md: # MD2/MD4/MD5 possible_em1.append(_EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, k, False)) except ValueError: raise ValueError("Invalid signature") # Step 4 # By comparing the full encodings (as opposed to checking each # of its components one at a time) we avoid attacks to the padding # scheme like Bleichenbacher's (see http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg06537). # if em1 not in possible_em1: raise ValueError("Invalid signature") pass def _EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(msg_hash, emLen, with_hash_parameters=True): """ Implement the ``EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE`` function, as defined in PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447, 9.2). ``_EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE`` actually accepts the message ``M`` as input, and hash it internally. Here, we expect that the message has already been hashed instead. :Parameters: msg_hash : hash object The hash object that holds the digest of the message being signed. emLen : int The length the final encoding must have, in bytes. with_hash_parameters : bool If True (default), include NULL parameters for the hash algorithm in the ``digestAlgorithm`` SEQUENCE. :attention: the early standard (RFC2313) stated that ``DigestInfo`` had to be BER-encoded. This means that old signatures might have length tags in indefinite form, which is not supported in DER. Such encoding cannot be reproduced by this function. :Return: An ``emLen`` byte long string that encodes the hash. """ # First, build the ASN.1 DER object DigestInfo: # # DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { # digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, # digest OCTET STRING # } # # where digestAlgorithm identifies the hash function and shall be an # algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms. # # PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { # { OID id-md2 PARAMETERS NULL }| # { OID id-md5 PARAMETERS NULL }| # { OID id-sha1 PARAMETERS NULL }| # { OID id-sha256 PARAMETERS NULL }| # { OID id-sha384 PARAMETERS NULL }| # { OID id-sha512 PARAMETERS NULL } # } # # Appendix B.1 also says that for SHA-1/-2 algorithms, the parameters # should be omitted. They may be present, but when they are, they shall # have NULL value. digestAlgo = DerSequence([ DerObjectId(msg_hash.oid).encode() ]) if with_hash_parameters: digestAlgo.append(DerNull().encode()) digest = DerOctetString(msg_hash.digest()) digestInfo = DerSequence([ digestAlgo.encode(), digest.encode() ]).encode() # We need at least 11 bytes for the remaining data: 3 fixed bytes and # at least 8 bytes of padding). if emLen<len(digestInfo)+11: raise TypeError("Selected hash algorithm has a too long digest (%d bytes)." % len(digest)) PS = b'\xFF' * (emLen - len(digestInfo) - 3) return b'\x00\x01' + PS + b'\x00' + digestInfo def new(rsa_key): """Create a signature object for creating or verifying PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures. :parameter rsa_key: The RSA key to use for signing or verifying the message. This is a :class:`Crypto.PublicKey.RSA` object. Signing is only possible when ``rsa_key`` is a **private** RSA key. :type rsa_key: RSA object :return: a :class:`PKCS115_SigScheme` signature object """ return PKCS115_SigScheme(rsa_key)
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